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Many statutes contain what appear to be precise logical constructions. Here are some examples from Canada using "if and only if." But this is not the norm and does not necessarily confine the meaning of the statute. See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Even the construction "if and only if" is often redundant, for example, in statutes that confer the power to do something on a court or another decision-maker. Section 15.1(7) of the Divorce Act says:

Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines on the consent of both spouses if it is satisfied that reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of the child to whom the order relates.

That doesn't say "if and only if", but reading the sentence in its grammatical and ordinary sense leads to the understanding that only if the court is thus satisfied does it have the power to award an amount that differs from the guidelines.

From a practical perspective, the text of statutes is drafted by expert legislative drafters with a goal of designing the statute to avoid litigation and to have no inconsistencies or deficiencies but this is merely an ideal.

An idealistic presentation of law as logic can be found in Hans Kelsen's The Pure Theory of Law. But even this view does not imply that the circumstances in which the condition is triggered can be rigourously defined. This is where the grey in law can be found. This grey area, or penumbra of uncertainty, is well described by HLA Hart in his writing on the "open texture" of language and law (see The Concept of Law). See also Frederick Schauer, "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park"; and sometimes, a fish is not a "tangible object" (Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)).

Many statutes contain what appear to be precise logical constructions. Here are some examples from Canada using "if and only if." But this is not the norm and does not necessarily confine the meaning of the statute. See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Even the construction "if and only if" is often redundant, for example, in statutes that confer the power to do something on a court or another decision-maker. Section 15.1(7) of the Divorce Act says:

Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines on the consent of both spouses if it is satisfied that reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of the child to whom the order relates.

That doesn't say "if and only if", but reading the sentence in its grammatical and ordinary sense leads to the understanding that only if the court is thus satisfied does it have the power to award an amount that differs from the guidelines.

From a practical perspective, the text of statutes is drafted by expert legislative drafters with a goal of designing the statute to avoid litigation and to have avoid inconsistencies or deficiencies but this is merely an ideal. And readability is another primary goal of drafting. A lot of guidance can be found here.

An idealistic presentation of law as logic can be found in Hans Kelsen's The Pure Theory of Law. But even this view does not imply that the circumstances in which the condition is triggered can be rigourously defined. This is where the grey in law can be found. This grey area, or penumbra of uncertainty, is well described by HLA Hart in his writing on the "open texture" of language and law (see The Concept of Law). See also Frederick Schauer, "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park"; and sometimes, a fish is not a "tangible object" (Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)).

Many statutes are written using precise logical constructions. Here are some examples from Canada using "if and only if." But this is not the norm and does not even necessarily confine the meaning of the statute. See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Even the construction "if and only if" is often redundant, for example, in statutes that confer the power to do something on a court or another decision-maker. Section 15.1(7) of the Divorce Act says:

Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines on the consent of both spouses if it is satisfied that reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of the child to whom the order relates.

That doesn't say "if and only if", but reading the sentence in its grammatical and ordinary sense leads to the understanding that only if the court is thus satisfied does it have the power to award an amount that differs from the guidelines.

From a practical perspective, the text of statutes is drafted by expert legislative drafters with a goal of designing the statute to avoid litigation and to have no inconsistencies or deficiencies.

An idealistic presentation of law as logic can be found in Hans Kelsen's The Pure Theory of Law. But even this view does not imply that the circumstances in which the condition is triggered can be rigourously defined. This is where the grey in law can be found. This grey area, or penumbra of uncertainty, is well described by HLA Hart in his writing on the "open texture" of language and law (see The Concept of Law). See also Frederick Schauer, "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park"; and sometimes, a fish is not a "tangible object" (Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)).

Many statutes contain what appear to be precise logical constructions. Here are some examples from Canada using "if and only if." But this is not the norm and does not necessarily confine the meaning of the statute. See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Even the construction "if and only if" is often redundant, for example, in statutes that confer the power to do something on a court or another decision-maker. Section 15.1(7) of the Divorce Act says:

Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines on the consent of both spouses if it is satisfied that reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of the child to whom the order relates.

That doesn't say "if and only if", but reading the sentence in its grammatical and ordinary sense leads to the understanding that only if the court is thus satisfied does it have the power to award an amount that differs from the guidelines.

From a practical perspective, the text of statutes is drafted by expert legislative drafters with a goal of designing the statute to avoid litigation and to have no inconsistencies or deficiencies but this is merely an ideal.

An idealistic presentation of law as logic can be found in Hans Kelsen's The Pure Theory of Law. But even this view does not imply that the circumstances in which the condition is triggered can be rigourously defined. This is where the grey in law can be found. This grey area, or penumbra of uncertainty, is well described by HLA Hart in his writing on the "open texture" of language and law (see The Concept of Law). See also Frederick Schauer, "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park"; and sometimes, a fish is not a "tangible object" (Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)).

Many statutes are written using precise logical constructions. Here are some examples from Canada using "if and only if." But this is not the norm and does not even necessarily confine the meaning of the statute. See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Even the construction "if and only if" is often redundant, for example, in statutes that confer the power to do something on a court or another decision-maker. Section 15.1(7) of the Divorce Act says:

Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines on the consent of both spouses if it is satisfied that reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of the child to whom the order relates.

That doesn't say "if and only if", but reading the sentence in its grammatical and ordinary sense leads to the understanding that only if the court is thus satisfied does it have the power to award an amount that differs from the guidelines.

From a practical perspective, the text of statutes is drafted by expert legislative drafters with a goal of designing the statute to avoid litigation and to have no inconsistencies or deficiencies.

An idealistic presentation of law as logic can be found in Hans Kelsen's The Pure Theory of Law. But even this view does not imply that the circumstances in which the condition is triggered can be rigourously defined. This is where the grey in law can be found. This grey area, or penumbra of uncertainty, is well described by HLA Hart in his writing on the "open texture" of language and law (see The Concept of Law). See also Frederick Schauer, "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park".

Many statutes are written using precise logical constructions. Here are some examples from Canada using "if and only if." But this is not the norm and does not even necessarily confine the meaning of the statute. See Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at para 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Even the construction "if and only if" is often redundant, for example, in statutes that confer the power to do something on a court or another decision-maker. Section 15.1(7) of the Divorce Act says:

Notwithstanding subsection (3), a court may award an amount that is different from the amount that would be determined in accordance with the applicable guidelines on the consent of both spouses if it is satisfied that reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of the child to whom the order relates.

That doesn't say "if and only if", but reading the sentence in its grammatical and ordinary sense leads to the understanding that only if the court is thus satisfied does it have the power to award an amount that differs from the guidelines.

From a practical perspective, the text of statutes is drafted by expert legislative drafters with a goal of designing the statute to avoid litigation and to have no inconsistencies or deficiencies.

An idealistic presentation of law as logic can be found in Hans Kelsen's The Pure Theory of Law. But even this view does not imply that the circumstances in which the condition is triggered can be rigourously defined. This is where the grey in law can be found. This grey area, or penumbra of uncertainty, is well described by HLA Hart in his writing on the "open texture" of language and law (see The Concept of Law). See also Frederick Schauer, "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park"; and sometimes, a fish is not a "tangible object" (Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015)).