No. The language in question dates from when "felony" denoted a much more serious class of crimes than it does today; traditionally, "felony" essentially meant "capital crime." Since then, California courts have narrowed the clause's meaning through caselaw. Incidentally, the provision in question appears in multiple state penal codes (it was a traditional common-law rule), and they have all restricted its meaning.
In 1961, a California appeals court considered this issue in People v. Jones (191 Call. App. 2d 478). The court ruled that
It is true that Penal Code, section 197, subdivision 1, does provide that homicide is justifiable when resisting an attempt to commit a felony. But the section does no more than codify the common law and should be read in the light of it. Taken at face value, and without qualification, it represents an oversimplification of the law today.
The authorities generally rely on Blackstone for the earliest expression of the rule. He rationalized it in terms of no killing being justified to prevent crime unless the offense was punishable by death. (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, pp. 180-182.) But in those days all felonies were capital offenses.
Perhaps the leading American case on the point is Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 336-341, where the early law is reviewed and rejected, and the application of the rule limited to the commission of felonies that involve a danger of great personal harm, or "some atrocious crime attempted to be committed by force." This limitation is today generally recognized.
This case involved a violent felony (wife-beating), but it was a felony because the legislature wanted to punish what would otherwise be misdemeanor assault more seriously in a domestic setting. As such,
The punishment provided by a statute is not necessarily an adequate test as to whether life may be taken for in some situations it is too artificial and unrealistic. We must look further into the character of the crime, and the manner of its perpetration (see Storey v. State, supra). When these do not reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm, as they could not if defendant apprehended only a misdemeanor assault, there is no cause for the exaction of a human life.