In times of open war, #3 may be the line for treason if the content can be considered enemy propaganda. There are two relevant treason cases during WWII, Gillars v. United States and Best v. United States where US citizens are convicted of treason for broadcasting radio programs meant to demoralize American fighting forces.
From Gillars, "While the crime is not committed by mere expressions of opinion or criticism, words spoken as part of a program of propaganda warfare, in the course of employment by the enemy in its conduct of war against the United States". Since Gillars and Best were being paid by the enemy, they are both an example of #4.
That said, you don't need to be paid by an enemy to show adherence. There are "rare cases where adherence might be proved by an overt act such as subscribing an oath of allegiance or accepting pay from an enemy" (U.S. v. Cramer). "Proof that a citizen did give aid and comfort to an enemy may well be in the circumstances sufficient evidence that he adhered to that enemy and intended and purposed to strike at his own country" (U.S. v. Kawakita), so circumstantial evidence is enough to prove adherence to the enemy. I think you can get to #3 with the facts of Best and Gillars of they had volunteered their time and not been paid. They still had treasonous intent and they still adhered to the enemy.
Cramer v. United States shows us that #2 cannot be treason because there is no adherence to the enemy. "A citizen may take actions which do aid and comfort the enemy — making a speech critical of the government or opposing its measures, profiteering, striking in defense plants or essential work, and the hundred other things which impair our cohesion and diminish our strength — but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason."
So #2 as written is not treason, but let us change the facts just slightly to try to get there. Let's say that what's written in #2 is inciting a rebellion or encouraging others to commit treason. "the speaking or writing of words may in itself be an act of such a nature as to constitute treason. Thus, while words which merely express a man's opinions or statements of intentions may not be treason, words which embody advice, or counsel, or inducement, or persuasion, to others to commit any of the acts recited in sub- divisions (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), supra,may constitute in themselves the act of advising, counselling, inducing, or persuading, which act may in itself be a treasonable act; and the embodiment of such words in circulars, or other printed matter, and their circulation or distribution may be treasonable acts. "Inciting or encouraging others" to aid the enemy, even if such incitement or encouragement is merely verbal, may constitute very substantial acts of aid and comfort" (WHAT IS GIVING AID AND COMFORT TO THE ENEMY?, CHARLES WARREN, citing U.S. v. Bletch)
So could we tweak the facts slightly to make #1 treason too? Say your fact-based and controversial document actually contains top secret military troop positioning. If you publish your article for the purpose of disseminating secrets to our enemy, then you might be guilty of treason. Proving that you had treasonous intent may be very hard, but technically possible. "Without going into details on the subject, I will briefly notice some things clearly involving the guilt of treason. Thus, to sell to, or provide arms or munitions of war, or military stores, or supplies, including food, clothing, etc., for the use of the enemy, is within the penalty of the statute. And to hire, sell, or furnish boats, railroad cars, or other means of transportation, or to advance money, or obtain credits, for the use and support of a hostile army is treasonable. It is equally clear that the communication of intelligence to the enemy by letter, telegraph, or otherwise, relating to the strength, movements, or position of the army, is an act of treason. These acts, thus briefly noted, show unequivocally an adherence to the enemy, and an unlawful purpose of giving him aid and comfort." (U.S. v. Bond)
You may have noticed that there are two ways you can commit treason. Either by "levying war" against the US, such as in a rebellion, or by providing "aid and comfort" to enemies. You can be charged for "levying war" in peace time since it doesn't require another state actor to commit this crime. "'Levying war' should be confined to insurrections and rebellions for the purpose of overturning the government" (United States v. Hanway). This is just you rebelling against the government. It's possible that you could be prosecuted for "levying war" by inciting others to commit treason, but that would probably be a very hard case to win with 1st amendment protections.
As for the state of the relationship between nations to warrant treason when providing "aid and comfort", it must be sufficiently bad to warrant the other state being an "enemy". A declared state of war is sufficient but not necessary. "Open hostilities" is really the standard.
"It may, I believe, be safely laid down, that every contention by force between two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their respective governments, is not only war, but public war.' If it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with an- other whole nation, and all the members of the nation declaring war, are authorized to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a *general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition. But hostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war; because not solemn, and because those who are authorized to commit hostilities, act under special authority, and can go no farther than to the extent of their commission. Still, however, it is public war, because it is an external contention by force, between some of the members of the two nations, authorized by the legitimate powers. It is a war between the two nations, though all the members are not authorized to commit hostilities such as in a 180. solemn war, where the government restrain the general power." (Bas v. Tingy)
The fascinating thing about this case is that it declared France an enemy because we had essentially sanctioned them, withdrawn diplomats, implementated tariffs, and had some minor skirmishes. You could make a case that we're in about the same place with Russia right now. We've expelled diplomats, sanctioned them, they're subject to Trump's tariffs, and we've militarily attacked them in Syria. Not to mention they've launched a cyber attack on us which according to US policy we view as a hostile act that we can respond to with military force. I think you can make a reasonable argument that they're am enemy.
About the Korean War
Thompson v. Whittier, 185 F. Supp. 306, 314 (D.D.C. 1960) (three-judge district court) and Martin v.
Young, 134 F . Supp. 204, 207, 208 (N.D. Cal. 1955). Martin, for example, was a habeas proceeding by a serviceman who was being court-martialed for allegedly aiding the enemy while, a prisoner of war in Korea. He had reenlisted after the term of enlistment in which his crime was alleged to have been committed, and was still in the armed forces at the time of his court-martial. A jurisdictional provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (since repealed or amended) provided for courts-martial for certain military personnel whose terms had expired, but only if they were not triable for the same offense or a greater one in a civil court. The district court found that Martin could have been tried in a civil court on (among other charges) a charge of treason, and therefore that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction to try him oh a lesser, aiding the enemy charge. Implicit in the court's decision was the view that treason could have been established for giving aid and comfort to the enemy during the undeclared war in Korea.