O'Sullivan & Hilliard's The Law of Contract (Core Texts Series) (2018 8 ed). p. 83
4.29 A similar issue arose in a slightly diﬀerent way in Shaker v Vistajet Group Holding SA (2012). There, the claimant paid a deposit in respect of the purchase of an aircraft from the defendant under the terms of a letter agreed by the two parties. The letter expressly provided that the claimant agreed to proceed in good faith and to use reasonable endeavours to agree the formal sale contract and associated documents. The formal contract could not be agreed, so the claimant sought repayment of the deposit, but the defendant refused, contending that the claimant had not complied with its [1.] good faith and [2.] reasonable endeavour obligations. Teare J accepted that the intention of the agreement was that the deposit could only be recovered if these obligations had been complied with, but held that the obligations were unenforceable because of the impossibility of ‘polic[ing]’ them, that is, of working out whether they had been breached or not. It distinguished
the Petromec decision on the basis that there were objective criteria available in that case to assist the court in determining whether the obligation had been breached. It is respectfully suggested that Teare J may have been too ready to find that the obligations were unenforceable, as this [unenforceability of reasonable endeavour obligations] would have allowed the claimant to recover its deposit even if it had acted in bad faith** (which on the facts it did not). There are many types of conduct that everyone would agree constitute bad faith, so if the conduct fell into this category, there would be no practical impediment to the court policing the obligation.
As the contract had the two obligations that I numbered on p. 43, I don't understand the emboldened sentence.
If the claimant acted in bad faith, then wouldn't it breach [1.]? If it did, then why would the unenforceability of reasonable endeavour obligations "have allowed the claimant to recover its deposit"?