How is it constitutional to require defendants to pay for counsel?

Question

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. (U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendment.)

The last Supreme Court ruling on this appears to be Gideon v. Wainwright, which applies the Sixth Amendment "right to counsel" for indigent defendants to the states. Apparently even that right is still under contention: many jurisdictions impose fees on defendants for the use of public counsel, regardless of their (in)ability to pay.

I'm still confounded by the reality that an American of any means could be required to pay for counsel in defense against criminal charges. Since, AFAIK, there is no way for an exonerated defendant to recoup the costs of his criminal defense, doesn't this amount to an "unconstitutional taking" of property?

I.e., does the present system really say, "You are presumed innocent, and you have the right to counsel in defense of that assertion, but you have to spend down to your last dollar to assert that right?"

If true, I guess the "American" solution might be something like legal insurance, but the principle sounds terrible.

Answer 1

The question has a false premise: the law does not require defendants to pay for counsel. The right to counsel can be waived. However, the fact that court-appointed counsel are provided only to indigent defendants does seem at odds with the text of the Sixth Amendment. I will explain why the right is limited by reviewing the cases and historical background.

Original meaning of the Sixth Amendment

Part of the answer is that the Sixth Amendment was (probably) not originally intended to create a right to court-appointed counsel at all. Rather, it reversed the historical rule that people accused of felonies were denied representation even if they could afford it. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), at pp 60–69:

Originally, in England, a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest ... Historically and in practice, in our own country, at least, [the right to a hearing] has always included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party asserting the right.

See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), at p 370:

There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment itself, as originally drafted by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, contemplated any guarantee other than the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution in a federal court to employ a lawyer to assist in his defense.

Basis of the modern rule

As noted in the question, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) is the leading case on this area of law today, but the modern rule was more precisely and recently stated in Scott, at pp 373–374:

We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.

Note that the rule is not derived directly from the Sixth Amendment (at least insofar as it applies to the States). The Bill of Rights did not apply to the States before the Civil War: Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). After the Reconstruction Amendments, through the process of incorporation, the Supreme Court began to accept that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause could entrench substantive rights against the States.

The modern rule recognises that any person who is unable to afford a lawyer and who is sentenced to imprisonment without legal representation has been deprived of their liberty without due process of law. It does not establish an absolute right to legal representation.

In Scott, after noting that the modern rule went beyond what was guaranteed by the text of the Sixth Amendment (understood in its historical context), the Court held that it did not extend to an indigent defendant who was fined for a petty theft. At p 373, the Court offered the following practical justification for limiting the rule:

[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger – that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment – is eminently sound, and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel. Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States.

An unconstitutional taking?

The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The concept of "taking for public use" is another one that's hard to pin down at the margins, but there's a good summary of the cases available in the section on When Property is Taken in the Constitution Annotated:

The older cases proceeded on the basis that the requirement of just compensation for property taken for public use referred only to "direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power." Accordingly, a variety of consequential injuries were held not to constitute takings ... Nor was government held liable for the extra expense which the property owner must obligate in order to ward off the consequence of the governmental action ... But the Court also decided long ago that land can be "taken" in the constitutional sense by physical invasion or occupation by the government, as occurs when the government floods land permanently or recurrently. A later formulation was that "[p]roperty is taken in the constitutional sense when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course of time."

I am not aware of any case in which it was argued that the need to pay for one's own legal representation amounted to a taking for public use. It is certainly a far cry from the compulsory acquisition of land. But perhaps in a case where the defendant is acquitted, or proven innocent, a takings argument could be run by analogy with the cases dealing with innocent people who suffered loss as a result of police execution of search warrants. See Everyone Benefits, Everyone Pays: Does the Fifth Amendment Mandate Compensation When Property is Damaged During the Course of Police Activities? 9 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 277 (2000) for more about these cases.

Answer 2

In criminal cases, defendants who do not make bond will be appointed a public defender automatically. The defendant does not pay for the public defender. Instead, their salary is payed for by taxes -- or something like that depending on where they are. If the defendant does make bond, they have to fill out a form which a judge will review and -- taking into account factors like income, etc. -- choose whether or not to assign you a public defender.

In civil cases, defendants can apply for a public defender but usually they are turned down. This is not because of the nature of the case, but instead because most people won't sue someone who doesn't even have enough money to get a lawyer, they sue the people who have tons of money. And, again, if you have tons of money, you probably won't be appointed a public defender. Even if you are, you probably will get your own lawyer because public defenders are usually very overloaded with cases and are not able to put a lot of time and attention into one specific case.

So, there is a little unfairness, but when you think about it, the people who can't get lawyers, usually are appointed ones and the people who can get lawyers buy their own. That seems fair enough. Right? Well, there is another problem to address: most of the public defenders, like I said before, have little to no time to focus on specific cases. Often, they will just get their defendant to plea out so that they can move on to another case. This means that a poor defendant almost always gets worse representation than a rich one.

It's not the defenders fault, they don't get paid by the hour and they have too much work to reasonably do. The decision to get a plea deal or even ignore a case is not out of evil on their part, it's out of stress. Instead, blame can be put on the system for not effectively paying for and sustaining a public defending structure. That's something to think about.

As your evidence suggests, it isn't really the constitutionality -- they are still "providing" lawyers -- it is more just wrong. It is something that will only change with another, more specific supreme court ruling.

Answer 3

Generally...

I am in complete agreement with the sentiment, and the moral rationale behind the question: I do think the Sixth Amendment is arguably imposing a duty on who is prosecuting a matter (in some states, similar to continental law jurisdictions in Europe where it for e.g. goes by the moniker "substitutive private prosecutor", one may press criminal charges and prosecute a matter through counsel or maybe even pro se).

The specific question...

"[...]there is no way for an exonerated defendant to recoup the costs of his criminal defense, doesn't this amount to an "unconstitutional taking" of property?"

It is, the Supreme Court decided "whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure continues beyond legal process so as to allow a malicious prosecution claim based upon the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 924(Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 924 (2017)

My previous arguments (not based on the argument of fallacy of reference to authority) also noted the same that it very well may be, but there is, in fact, in addition to the Constitutional claim, a statute that expressly allows for filing suit for redress in lawsuits typically referred to as "malicious prosecution" cases, in relevant part, 48 U.S.C. § 1983 on "Civil action for deprivation of rights" provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. [...]"

More specifically, the Civil Rights Attorney's Pees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that in any proceeding to enforce Section 1983,

"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."

Esther M. Schonfeld, Article, Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort: Continued Confusion and Uncertainty, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1681, 1689 (1999)

This appears to correctly address the specific question, but of course this is only applicable if found not guilty, and in addition to that, the party or parties bringing about the malicious prosecution are found liable or guilty in that regard or the relating potential criminal act, and the rule is only after the final ruling of the prosecution.

I will further address the Amendment VI implications of the questions which are able to address the broader question, too.