Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8 edn, 2018). p. 217
A. Simester, ‘Is Strict Liability Always Wrong?’ in A. Simester (ed.) Appraising Strict Liability (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 33– 7
Objections Specific to Paradigm (Stigmatic) Crimes
Suppose that the state were to create a crime of ‘homicide’, defined as a strict liability offence of causing death. Objections to crimes of this type depend, in turn, on the nature of the criminal law. Without dwelling on the familiar analysis, there seem to me to be certain paradigm features associated with the criminalization of μing. Ex ante, μing is prohibited and declared to be wrong: citizens are not merely requested but instructed not to. Ex post, where D is found to have transgressed, he is convicted of μing and liable to punishment which may be substantial, perhaps including imprisonment. The conviction and the punishment also express censure, to D, Y, and the public at large. As well as suffering hard treatment, D is labelled as a particular sort of criminal (a ‘μer’), a labelling that conveys a public implication of culpable wrongdoing.
These paradigm features of the criminal law imply certain objections to making μing a strict liability crime, at least where strict liability leads to conviction of blameless defendants . . .