In civil law jurisdictions, for example under French law, the drafter of the contract has a choice between labelling that 1 trillion clause either as a contractual penalty, or as liquidated damages. If they are secretly certain they'd never want to actually collect the penalty, they'll write whichever they think will make a stronger impression on the other party to try to stay in compliance. If they expect that taking the clause to the court might be necessary, they will probably formulate it as liquidated damages. Labelling it as a contractual penalty would read as an invitation for the court to assess its "adequacy", potentially reducing the amount to a merely symbolic level, even below any factual damages (assuming sub-trillion damage was caused by the non-compliance but not claimed).
The court can intervene and reduce the amount awarded even if they are enforcing liquidated damages, on the doctrine of "unfairness". But it's still easier for the court to enforce the agreed upon amount without much scrutiny, unless its disproportionality is glaringly obvious even to a layman in the subject of the dispute.
"All the money that you have, and then some" would be a really weird way to draft the contract. The drafter would have to be very certain that they would never need a court to enforce the contract. Such an amount is vague, and the court couldn't too easily enforce it even if it was bribed to want to. It's much preferable to have the other party's signature under a specific amount owed if you mean your threat. And it helps if it is not obvious that the amount was intended to be absurdly disproportional to the hypothetical and actual consequences of the breach and to the value of the contract.
Your goal in the negotiations should be that no matter what the other party does, and no matter what circumstances beyond their control arise, you'll be better off having this contract in hand than otherwise. You don't really need their trillions for anything, and you won't win their cooperation by requesting those.
Trying to ensure that they won't oversleep or underdeliver, that they will keep their tongue shut and keep out of accidentally signing something else that you don't want them to sign, would make your position more fragile than preparing for yourself some graceful exits from the contingencies you can think of.
In extreme cases it may be safest not to enter a contract which would be beneficial to you if it went as agreed to, but is more likely to expose you to a catastrophe if the other party reneges on their promises or is unable to meet them.