This issue was discussed in How to Lie with Statistics by Darrell Huff , fist published in 1954. Huff discuses the issue in terms of medical screening tests, rather than court evidence. If a test for a disease is 99.9% accurate (meaning a 0.1% rate of false positives, Huff also mentions that it is an error to assume that the false positive rate and false negative rate are the same), but the disease itself is rare, being found in only 1 person per 10,000 population, what is the chance that a person has the disease, given a positive screening test result? Many people incorrectly say 99.9%, the "accuracy" rate of the test. The correct answer is roughly 9%, because in a large population there will be about 10 false positives for every true positive. This error is still frequently made, despite having been widely pointed out more than 70 years ago.
Some of the continuing problems are pointed out in Statistics in Court by Nick Thieme (2018). The linked review refers to
experts confusing the probability of damning evidence given a defendant's innocence with the probability of innocence given damning evidence
Another relevant work is The Double Helix and the Law of Evidence, by David H. Kaye.
In "Error Costs, Legal Standards of Proof and
Statistical Significance" (2017) by Burtis, Michelle; Gelbach, Jonah B.; and Kobayashi, Bruce H., the authors say:
thresholds based on fixed significance levels imported from academic settings continue to be used as a legal standard of proof. Our positive analysis demonstrates how a choice of either a statistical significance threshold or a legal standard of proof represent alternative and often inconsistent attempts to balance error costs, and that thresholds based on fixed significance levels generally are not consistent with existing or optimal legal standards of proof.
In "Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice" by Daniel Shaviro (Harvard Law Review Vol. 103, No. 2 (Dec., 1989), pp. 530-554) he authors contend that courts often misuse or fail to use relevant statistical evince, while not making clear their own standards for error tolerance.
In "Misuse of Statistics in the Courtroom: The Sally Clark Case" by Dr. Alicia Carr, the misuse of statistics in the Sally Clark case is reviewed in some detail, with specific reference to the "Prosecutor’s Fallacy".
It would appear that legal use of statistics is still a long way from perfect, or even adequate.