No. The bill would not apply yet to Trump, and it likely violates the First Amendment.
SB 7072's deplatforming provisions would not apply to Trump yet.
SB 7072 prohibits social media platforms from deplatforming most candidates for public office during the period between their qualification as a candidate and the date the candidacy ends. "Deplatforming" is defined to include deleting or banning a user's account for more than 14 days. "Candidate" is a person "who files qualification papers and subscribes to a candidate’s oath as required by law."
At this point, Trump has not -- as far as I know -- filed qualification papers for any office or subscribed to a candidate's oath, so the bill does not currently apply to him. Once he filed papers, though, he would be within the scope of the law's protection.
The First Amendment would likely prohibit its deplatforming provisions from ever taking effect.
Florida may have forgotten, but it has tried this before and lost. It had enacted a "right of reply" statute that required publishers who criticized any political candidate to then print any response that the candidate wanted printed. The Florida Suprme Court -- being composed of seven of Florida Man -- thought this posed no First Amendment problems at all, but the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed:
We see that, beginning with Associated Press, the Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction or requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise print. The clear implication has been that any such a compulsion to publish that which reason tells them should not be published is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution, and, like many other virtues, it cannot be legislated.
And the legislative findings in SB 7072 echo Tornillo's arguments from 50 years earlier. They emphasize the increased prominence and monopoly-like market dominance of social-media companies, the "unfairness" of deplatforming and shadow bans, and the importance of fostering First Amendment-protected speech. But the Court rejected all those rationales for compelling speech:
The Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. ... The decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials -- whether fair or unfair -- constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
It seems quite unlikely that the courts would treat Facebook or Twitter any differently based on the fact that they are not members of the institutional press; instead, the Court applies the same principles to compelled-speech cases involving individuals and businesses. Most directly on point is Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995), where the Court said that if a group is organizing a parade, the state may not compel the group to include "a group imparting a message the organizers do not wish to convey."
Our holding today rests not on any particular view about the Council's message but on the Nation's commitment to protect freedom of speech. Disapproval of a private speaker's statement does not legitimize use of the Commonwealth's power to compel the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to others.
The Court reached similar outcomes in other cases as well. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (“The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”); Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. ”)
Besides the compelled-speech problem, SB 7072 also runs into trouble it is a content-based restriction on speech. Speech by candidates is protected; speech by others is not. Speech by a "theme park or entertainment complex" is subject to the act; speech by others is not. Because it discriminates based on the speaker, it is treated as a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”)
To survive a challenge, then, Florida would need to identify a compelling governmental interest advanced by its law and prove that SB 7072's requirements are the least-restrictive means of achieving that interest. It won't be able to do that; even if facilitating candidate speech is a compelling governmental interest, the state can find less restrictive means of doing so, whether that's giving candidates airtime on public-access channels, hosting content on florida.gov, or setting up its own social-media site.