In 2006 Section 29J was added the Public Order Act 1986 which provides freedom of belief and expression defense for religiously aggravated versions of public order offences.
Hammond v DPP applies a balancing exercise in a very different style than appears to have been envisioned by parliament in providing s29J. Admittedly s29J doesn't seem to be directly applicable to the case in question. But it gives an insight on parliamentary intent as to how they might have intended ECHR Article 9 & 10 rights to be balanced against public interest of public order.
If the case in question had been heard after parliament had assented the addition of s29J, would there have been any impetus for the court to have considered the intent of parliament that could have been seen through their inclusion of the s29J defence in other offences?
It would seem quite clear that the framers of s29J would have had definite qualms about prohibiting people from advocating the idea that homosexuality is immoral so long as no vitriol is directed at homosexuals as such. It seems clear that they felt people should be allowed to criticize and condemn ideas and ways of life, if not their followers per se.
Put another way is the idea of consistency reflected by the imperative of stare decisis when basing decisions on case law also apply when ruling on statutory intent?
In other words precedent judicial intent appears to be binding and required to maintain consistency. Is such a principle of consistency equally applicable to legislative intent?