First, a correction to the facts. At paragraph 6 of the appeal reasons, it says:
When spoken to by police the appellant expressed shame and remorse, acknowledging that the act had occurred when the victim was asleep and in circumstances where he knew she could not consent.
And the factual summary of the offence says that:
During the night the appellant awoke to the victim asleep next to him
So, you may have misunderstood the facts of the real-world scenario. But since your question is based on a hypothetical, I will go on to answer it.
Capacity to consent
To have the capacity to consent, a complainant must understand the following (R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20):
the physical act;
that the act is sexual in nature;
the specific identity of the complainant’s partner or partners; and
that they have the choice to refuse to participate in the sexual activity.
Without understanding those four things, a complainant cannot consent.
The Criminal Code also lists several circumstances in which consent is deemed to not be present (s. 273.1(2)(b)), one of which is when the complainant is unconscious; another is when the accused induces the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority.
Actual consent and mistaken belief in communicated consent
You also ask whether "voluntarily sharing bed and lack of objections to what the man was doing while she was awake... constitute consent from the point of view of a reasonable person."
That is not a relevant question in Canadian law. Consent is not based on the view of a reasonable person. Consent for the purpose of sexual assault is only the subjective consent by the complainant. "For the purposes of the actus reus 'consent' means that the complainant in her mind wanted the sexual touching to take place" (R. v. Ewanchuk,  1 SCR 330). There is no such thing as "implied consent" in Canadian law.
There is a defence or "mistaken belief in communicated consent" however. This is available when the defendant: (1) has taken reasonable steps to ascertain consent; and, (2) has the honest belief that the complainant actually communicated consent.
It is highly doubtful that the steps taken in your hypothetical would be reasonable steps to ascertain consent in Canada. See R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, para. 107:
an accused cannot point to his reliance on the complainant’s silence, passivity, or ambiguous conduct as a reasonable step to ascertain consent, as a belief that any of these factors constitutes consent is a mistake of law ... an accused’s attempt to “test the waters” by recklessly or knowingly engaging in non-consensual sexual touching cannot be considered a reasonable step. This is a particularly acute issue in the context of unconscious or semi-conscious complainant.