The US is a party to the 1948 genocide convention (full text here), and is obligated by it not to support genocide, and, in fact, to act to prevent genocide. It has also codified the convention into federal law: The Genocide Convention Implementation Act (18 U.S.C. § 1091).

Recently, a group of plaintiffs including Defense of Children International - Palestine, Al-Haq and others, filed a case in US court (district court for the northern district of California), against the President, the secretary of defense and others, praying the court to...

• declare violations of the legal duties to prevent and not to assist in genocide;
• order the defendants to exert influence over Israel in various ways to prevent the genocide.
• enjoin the defendants from arming Israel and from obstructing the UN and others from implementing a cease fire.
• any further relief

Now, the court has dismissed the case, finding it lacks jurisdiction to hear it, applying the "Political question doctrine":

“There are rare cases in which the preferred outcome is inaccessible to the Court,” wrote U.S. District Judge Jeffrey S. White. “This is one of those cases. The Court is bound by precedent and the division of our coordinate branches of government to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. Yet, as the ICJ has found, it is plausible that Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide. This Court implores Defendants to examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza.”

I'm not a US legal scholar, but this sounds a rather bizarre argument. The convention, and its codifying act, bind all branches the entire US government, does it not? How come the convention (and the act) do not override intra-US legal precedent, compelling the court to hear the case? i.e. why can the court say "Hey international community, I know the US is bound by the convention, but my friends here inside the US tell me that we have a custom of me not butting in, so I too, as part of the government, will refuse to act to prevent genocide, despite the US not having indicated any doctrinal exceptions to its accession to the convention." ... I don't see how this makes sense. Does it?

Note that the court could have heard the case, stating that it will only grant general and inspecific relief rather than order specific acts (like a weapons embargo) based on that doctrine, if the argument had been "it is not for the courts to say how to politically and logistically achieve the satisfaction of convention obligations" - but that's not the direction it took.

The US is a party to the 1948 genocide convention (full text here), and is obligated by it not to support genocide, and, in fact, to act to prevent genocide. It has also codified the convention into federal law: The Genocide Convention Implementation Act (18 U.S.C. § 1091).

Recently, a group of plaintiffs including Defense of Children International - Palestine, Al-Haq and others, filed a case in US court (district court for the northern district of California), against the President, the secretary of defense and others, praying the court to...

• declare violations of the legal duties to prevent and not to assist in genocide;
• order the defendants to exert influence over Israel in various ways to prevent the genocide.
• enjoin the defendants from arming Israel and from obstructing the UN and others from implementing a cease fire.
• any further relief

Now, the court has dismissed the case, finding it lacks jurisdiction to hear it, applying the "Political question doctrine":

“There are rare cases in which the preferred outcome is inaccessible to the Court,” wrote U.S. District Judge Jeffrey S. White. “This is one of those cases. The Court is bound by precedent and the division of our coordinate branches of government to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. Yet, as the ICJ has found, it is plausible that Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide. This Court implores Defendants to examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza.”

I'm not a US legal scholar, but this sounds a rather bizarre argument. The convention, and its codifying act, bind all branches the entire US government, does it not? How come the convention (and the act) do not override intra-US legal precedent, compelling the court to hear the case? i.e. why can the court say "Hey international community, I know the US is bound by the convention, but my friends here inside the US tell me that we have a custom of me not butting in, so I too, as part of the government, will refuse to act to prevent genocide, despite the US not having indicated any doctrinal exceptions to its accession to the convention." ... I don't see how this makes sense. Does it?

Note that the court could have heard the case, stating that it will only grant general and inspecific relief rather than order specific acts (like a weapons embargo) based on that doctrine, if the argument had been "it is not for the courts to say how to politically and logistically achieve the satisfaction of convention obligations" - but that's not the direction it took.

The US is a party to the 1948 genocide convention, and is obligated by it not to support genocide, and, in fact, to act to prevent genocide. It has also codified the convention into federal law: The Genocide Convention Implementation Act (18 U.S.C. § 1091).

Recently, a group of plaintiffs including Defense of Children International - Palestine, Al-Haq and others, filed a case in US court (district court for the northern district of California), against the President, the secretary of defense and others, praying the court to...

• declare violations of the legal duties to prevent and not to assist in genocide;
• order the defendants to exert influence over Israel in various ways to prevent the genocide.
• enjoin the defendants from arming Israel and from obstructing the UN and others from implementing a cease fire.
• any further relief

Now, the court has dismissed the case, finding it lacks jurisdiction to hear it, applying the "Political question doctrine":

“There are rare cases in which the preferred outcome is inaccessible to the Court,” wrote U.S. District Judge Jeffrey S. White. “This is one of those cases. The Court is bound by precedent and the division of our coordinate branches of government to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. Yet, as the ICJ has found, it is plausible that Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide. This Court implores Defendants to examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza.”

I'm not a US legal scholar, but this sounds a rather bizarre argument. The convention, and its codifying act, bind all branches the entire US government, does it not? How come the convention (and the act) do not override intra-US legal precedent, compelling the court to hear the case? i.e. why can the court say "Hey international community, I know the US is bound by the convention, but my friends here inside the US tell me that we have a custom of me not butting in, so I too, as part of the government, will refuse to act to prevent genocide, despite the US not having indicated any doctrinal exceptions to its accession to the convention." ... I don't see how this makes sense. Does it?

Note that the court could have heard the case, stating that it will only grant general and inspecific relief rather than order specific acts (like a weapons embargo) based on that doctrine, if the argument had been "it is not for the courts to say how to politically and logistically achieve the satisfaction of convention obligations" - but that's not the direction it took.

The US is a party to the 1948 genocide convention (full text here), and is obligated by it not to support genocide, and, in fact, to act to prevent genocide. It has also codified the convention into federal law: The Genocide Convention Implementation Act (18 U.S.C. § 1091).

Recently, a group of plaintiffs including Defense of Children International - Palestine, Al-Haq and others, filed a case in US court (district court for the northern district of California), against the President, the secretary of defense and others, praying the court to...

• declare violations of the legal duties to prevent and not to assist in genocide;
• order the defendants to exert influence over Israel in various ways to prevent the genocide.
• enjoin the defendants from arming Israel and from obstructing the UN and others from implementing a cease fire.
• any further relief

Now, the court has dismissed the case, finding it lacks jurisdiction to hear it, applying the "Political question doctrine":

“There are rare cases in which the preferred outcome is inaccessible to the Court,” wrote U.S. District Judge Jeffrey S. White. “This is one of those cases. The Court is bound by precedent and the division of our coordinate branches of government to abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this matter. Yet, as the ICJ has found, it is plausible that Israel’s conduct amounts to genocide. This Court implores Defendants to examine the results of their unflagging support of the military siege against the Palestinians in Gaza.”

I'm not a US legal scholar, but this sounds a rather bizarre argument. The convention, and its codifying act, bind all branches the entire US government, does it not? How come the convention (and the act) do not override intra-US legal precedent, compelling the court to hear the case? i.e. why can the court say "Hey international community, I know the US is bound by the convention, but my friends here inside the US tell me that we have a custom of me not butting in, so I too, as part of the government, will refuse to act to prevent genocide, despite the US not having indicated any doctrinal exceptions to its accession to the convention." ... I don't see how this makes sense. Does it?

Note that the court could have heard the case, stating that it will only grant general and inspecific relief rather than order specific acts (like a weapons embargo) based on that doctrine, if the argument had been "it is not for the courts to say how to politically and logistically achieve the satisfaction of convention obligations" - but that's not the direction it took.