The standard is this, from Teague v. Lane:
If a case announces a “new rule,” an opinion by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor said, the new rule will apply to all cases pending on direct
review; but in most cases it will not apply to cases already final.
There are two exceptions:
First, a “new rule” will apply retroactively if it is “substantive,”
meaning eliminating certain crimes (all sodomy cases, say, after
Lawrence v. Texas) or protecting certain classes of people from
certain punishments—as in the Court’s recent decisions that juvenile
offenders and the intellectually disabled cannot be sentenced to
death. The issue in Montgomery is whether the new rule against “true
life” sentences for juvenile is that kind of “substantive” rule. The
Miller Court said that states could no longer subject juvenile
defendants to automatic sentences of life without parole; it didn’t
say that a court could not sentence any juveniles to that penalty. Is
that a “substantive” exclusion of juveniles—or a requirement of
individualized sentencing that makes a mere “procedural” change to the
law?
The second exception to Teague is for a “watershed rule of criminal
procedure,” meaning one that the Court finds to be an “absolute
prerequisite” to a fair and accurate trial. This is a terrific
exception except that, well, there seemingly aren’t any “watershed
cases.”