Turning to the cause of action for unjust enrichment, such a cause of
action arises when one party possesses money or obtains a benefit that
in equity and good conscience they should not have obtained or
possessed because it rightfully belongs to another ***." (Mente v.
Wenzel, 178 AD2d 705, 706; see, Strong v. Strong, 277 AD2d 533). To
state a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must allege "that
(1) the other party was enriched, (2) at that party's expense, and (3)
that it is against equity and good conscience to permit the other
party to retain what is sought to be recovered ***." (Mandarin
Trading Ltd. v. Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173, 182 [brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted]; Georgia Malone & Co., Inc. v. Rieder, 19
NY3d 511, 516.). In the case at bar, the plaintiff produced sufficient
evidence to show that there are genuine issues of fact to be tried
regarding the elements of a cause of action for unjust enrichment.
Turning to the cause of action for the imposition of a constructive
trust, in order to have a constructive trust imposed, a plaintiff
generally must "plead and prove four essential elements: (1) a
confidential or fiduciary relationship, (2) a promise, express or
implied, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon, and (4) unjust enrichment
caused by the breach of the promise ***." (Valvo v. Spitale, 305 AD2d
668, 669; Sanxhaku v. Margetis, 151 AD3d 778; see, Sharp v Kosmalski,
40 NY2d 119; Lipton v. Donnenfeld, 5 AD3d 356; accord, Ernest Edward
Badway New York Causes of Action: Elements & Defenses 2018 (New York
Law Journal publishers 2018) (containing excellent discussion).
In Cullen v. Torsiello, 156 AD3d 680 (2nd Dept. 2017), the Second
Department, reversing the court below, recently emphasized "the broad
and flexible constructive trust doctrine."
In New York, "a constructive trust may be imposed when property has
been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest." Sharp v.
Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119 (1976) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted). Constructive trust is "the formula through which the
conscience of equity finds expression," and thus "[w]hen property has
been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity
converts him into a trustee." Simonds v. Simonds, 45 NY2d 233 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The purpose of the constructive trust doctrine "is to prevent unjust
enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate
the performance of a wrongful act." Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194
F.3d 357, 361 (2nd Cir. 1999). Such "[u]njust enrichment results when
a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the
transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be
inequitable to retain." Id.; see also, Simonds, 45 N.Y2d 233 ("What is
required, generally, is that a party hold property under such
circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to
retain it." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Four factors have been set forth for evaluating whether a constructive
trust should be imposed: "(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation,
(2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust
enrichment." Sharp, 40 NY2d 119. These factors, however, are only
guidelines, as the "constructive trust doctrine is not rigidly
limited." Simonds, 45 NY2d 233; see also Counihan v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 194 F.3d at 362 ("[W]e have observed that, although these factors
provide important guideposts, the constructive trust doctrine is
equitable in nature and should not be rigidly limited." (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted). The New York Court of Appeals
aptly and eloquently stated that the applicability of the constructive
trust doctrine "is limited only by the inventiveness of men who find
new ways to enrich themselves unjustly by grasping what should not
belong to them." Latham v. Father Divine, 299 NY 22, 27 (1949).
Almost seventy years later, those memorable words in Latham v. Father
Divine still ring true. As long as the unprincipled knavery and
manipulative misconduct of deceitful predators continue to victimize
the trusting, vulnerable, and unwary, courts are adept at using the
constructive trust doctrine to combat such betrayal, greed, and
treachery. "The doctrine of constructive trust is not limited to that
subspecies, but is given broad scope to flex in response to all human
implications of the transaction, to remedy whatever knavery ingenious
wrongdoers can invent, to give expression to the conscience of equity,
and to satisfy the demands of justice." Nastasi v. Nastasi, 26 AD3d
32, 38 (2nd Dept. 2005). "The constructive trust doctrine is given
broad scope to respond to all human implications of a transaction in
order to give expression to the conscience of equity and to satisfy
the demands of justice." Kaprov v. Stalinsky, 145 AD3d 869, 872 (2nd
Dept. 2016), lv. to appeal denied, 29 NY3d 913 (2017).
For the purposes of this cause of action, a confidential relationship
can exist between family members (see, Igneri v. Igneri, 125 AD3d 813
[uncle and niece]), and defendant Meta himself alleges that the
plaintiff's father regarded him as family. "Over time, I became like
family with Johnny and his wife." In any event, the doctrine of
constructive trust " is available to prevent unjust enrichment in a
wide range of circumstances" and "[t]he factors are not rigidly
applied but are flexible, and a constructive trust will be imposed to
satisfy the demands of justice ***." (Lipton v. Donnenfeld, 5 AD3d
356, supra; Sanxhaku v. Margetis, 151 AD3d 778, supra.)
But, as noted, constructive trust is a flexible remedy and would probably be applied in the context of someone gambling with stolen funds as well.